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i 
 
The efficiency of land lease markets is a critical issue in many developing countries, where land 
sales markets are often thin and inhibited by problems of asymmetric information and transaction costs. 
The issue is particularly important in Ethiopia, where land sales are officially prohibited by the new 
Constitution and where land leases were prohibited by the former Marxist government until 1991. Land 
leases have been permitted since 1991, and are again becoming common in many parts of Ethiopia. Now 
is thus an opportune time to assess the efficiency of the lease markets developing in Ethiopia. 
There is an old and large literature on land tenure contracts and their implications for agricultural 
efficiency. Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Marshall, and many economists since have argued that 
share tenancy causes inefficient resource allocation because the share tenant receives only a fraction of 
the value of his marginal product of labor, thus reducing the incentive to supply labor or other inputs. 
More recently, others have argued that if the tenant’s work effort can be costlessly monitored and 
enforced by the landlord, then resource allocation can be as efficient under sharecropping as under owner-
cultivation or fixed-rent tenancy (Johnson; Cheung). Whether costs of monitoring and enforcing tenancy 
contracts are sufficiently low to allow for efficient sharecropping is of course an empirical question. 
The available empirical evidence on the efficiency of land tenure contracts is mixed. The majority 
of studies do not find significant inefficiency of share tenancy (Otsuka and Hayami). However, many of 
these studies did not adequately distinguish sharecroppers from fixed-rent tenants or owner-operators and 
did not control for other factors that may affect input use and productivity, such as land quality or 
differences in farmers’ endowments or abilities (Shaban). Several studies that did control for such 
characteristics have found evidence supporting the “Marshallian” perspective of inefficient sharecropping 
(Bell; Shaban; Sadoulet, Fukui and de Janvry; Laffont and Matoussi; Chunrong Al, Arcand and Ethier). 
The existing empirical literature on the efficiency of land lease markets is dominated by studies 
conducted in south and southeast Asia, with very little information available from sub-Saharan Africa. In 
this paper, we investigate this issue using data collected in four villages of Ethiopia.  In a recent paper, 





owner-cultivated plots in these villages, while use of inputs was similar.  However, they did not provide 
statistical tests of their results or control for other factors that may have caused measured differences in 
total factor productivity.  
  In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of land use, land contract choice, and other input 
use that includes transaction costs, as well as allowing risk pooling motives and non-tradable productive 
inputs such as draft animal services or human capital.  We test the implications of this model compared to 
those of the “Marshallian” (unenforceable labor effort) and “New School” (costlessly enforceable effort) 
perspectives.  Our findings support the “New School” perspective of a well functioning lease market in 
the Ethiopian villages studied. 
 
Land Markets in the Study Villages 
The study was conducted in the Arsi zone of the Oromia region of Ethiopia.  In this area, there 
was an active land market before the Marxist Derg regime nationalized land in 1975. Land redistribution 
by the Peasant Association (PA, usually consisting of a few villages) was the only means of accessing 
land during the Derg period, but there have been no redistributions in this region since the fall of the Derg 
in 1991.  Since then, land leasing and informal transfers have again become common.  
The means used to acquire access to land are gifts or borrowing, fixed-rental and sharecropping.  
Gift fields are given free of any explicit charge for an indefinite period, while borrowed fields are also 
free but provided for a specified period.  In terms of contract duration, gift and borrowed land are most 
like PA-allocated land, since the duration is generally longer for this type of land than for rented or 
sharecropped land.  Gift and borrowed land are usually provided by relatives, often parents providing land 
to newly married children.  Because of their similarities, these two categories are combined in the 
analysis.   
Fixed rental involves a cash payment paid in advance to the landlord.  The tenant pays for all 





related to the tenant, the contract is almost always for only one year, and a written contract is used in most 
cases. 
Sharecropping agreements provide a share of the harvest to the landowner, usually one-half or 
one-third.  The landowner is usually not a relative of the share tenant.  The contract is usually for only one 
year.  In contracts in which the landowner receives a one-half share, the landowner often provides a share 
of the inputs in production and harvesting, including purchased inputs and harvesting labor, though the 
terms vary significantly across contracts.  It is rare for the landowner to provide oxen or pre-harvest labor, 
however.  Direct credit linkages between landlords and tenants are also relatively rare.  
This study is based upon a survey conducted by the International Livestock Research Institute in 
four PAs in the Arsi zone in 1994.  A sample of 161 households was selected, stratified by whether the 
households “owned” (were allocated by the PA in a prior land distribution) any land.  There were 115 
PA-allocated (“landowning”) households and 46 non-PA allocated (“landless”) households in the sample.  
All of the landless households and many of the landowning households acquired (“imported”) cropland 
through gift, borrowing or leasing arrangements.  The surveys collected information about these 
households and their operated plots.  No information was collected on the plots that households gave, 
loaned or leased out (“exported”), though information was collected on which households were land 
exporters. 
Households farming owner-operated fields tend to own more cropland, have more labor, are older 
and less educated than the households operating imported fields (table 1).  Recipients of gift/borrowed 
plots tend to have fewer workers in the household and to be poorer in general (less land owned, less 
livestock), younger, more educated, of longer residence in the village, and more likely to be related to the 
landowner than operators of land acquired under other tenure arrangements.  There are few clear 
differences between characteristics of tenants who have acquired land under fixed rental and those using 
sharecropping, except that sharecropping is not used by recent immigrants to the villages and is less 





depends on social relationships that may determine the transaction costs of screening and monitoring 
tenants. 
There are also some differences in the characteristics of the plots operated under different tenure 
arrangements.  Owner-operated plots are less likely to have red soils and more likely to be irrigated than 
imported plots.  Rented plots are least likely to have reported erosion problems, but are further from the 
operator household’s residence than other tenure categories.  Sharecropped plots also tend to be 
somewhat further from the residence than owner-operated or gift/borrowed plots.  Overall, however, it is 
not clear that the average quality of land is superior or inferior in any tenure category. 
Total labor and oxen use per hectare are lower on sharecropped fields than on other fields.  The 
value of output per hectare is highest on owner-operated fields and lowest on gift/borrowed fields.  These 
differences in input use and output per hectare may be due to other factors than tenure status however, 
such as the differences in tenant household characteristics or plot quality characteristics mentioned above.  
Below we investigate whether such differences are robust after controlling for differences in village and 
household characteristics and plot quality. 
 
Theory of Land Tenancy Contracts 
  Restrictions on land sales need not be a source of inefficiency, and achieving efficiency may not 
even require land lease markets to function.  If there are perfect markets for other factors of production, 
those factors can be hired in or out by landowners until landowners earn equal marginal products for all 
factors of production, resulting in productive efficiency (Binswanger and Rosenzweig).  Tenancy is thus 
not necessary unless there is some other market imperfection.  
In the presence of production risk and missing insurance markets, households can use share 
contracts to achieve perfect risk pooling and productive efficiency, provided that the intensity of labor 
effort can be costlessly monitored and enforced (Johnson; Cheung).  Cheung thus takes risk pooling as an 
argument for the existence of sharecropping.  Newbery has shown, however, that if the production 





pooling and efficiency can be achieved by a combination of fixed rental and wage contracts.  Thus some 
additional market imperfection is necessary to explain the choice of sharecropping, even with a missing 
insurance market. 
One of the most commonly cited rationales for sharecropping is the difficulty of monitoring labor 
effort.  If labor effort is unobservable, sharecropping will dominate wage labor because of its incentive 
advantages and dominate fixed rental because of its risk pooling advantages (Stiglitz).   Although this 
argument is persuasive, it is not clear how it could lead to multiple contract forms coexisting in the same 
communities, unless, as seems unlikely in the context of smallholders in Ethiopia, some tenants are risk 
neutral while others are risk averse. 
Cash constraints could lead to multiple contract forms.  Tenants who are cash constrained might 
be unable to pay a cash rent and thus be forced to use share tenancy.  For similar reasons, cash 
constrained landlords may prefer to use cash rental.  Whether such differences in contracts have any 
implications for agricultural efficiency, however, depends upon whether there are transaction costs of 
monitoring and enforcing contracts.  If labor can be costlessly monitored, then any outcome achievable 
via a cash rental contract can also be achieved via a share rental contract, as in Cheung’s model.  Thus, 
transaction costs are essential to explain why productive inefficiency may result as a result of differences 
in lease contracts. 
In this paper, we consider a model in which tenants’ effort is observable but costly to monitor and 
enforce.  In this case, coexistence of fixed rental and sharecropping contracts may occur as a result of 
differences in transaction costs.  Below, we derive the empirical implications of this model and contrast 
those to the implications of the “New School” model with costless enforcement and the “Marshallian” 
model with unenforceable effort.   
Model 
  Suppose that production is determined by three factors of production: land (H), labor (L) and 
capital services (K).   Production by household i on plot p (Y
ip) is assumed to be a constant returns to 
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q is a random variable with an expected value of 1 and positive variance, and which is unknown to 
households at the time decisions about H and L are made.   We assume that q is the same for all 
households in a village, as may result from weather or price related risks, though the model could be 
readily extended to incorporate idiosyncratic risks. 
   Households are endowed with land (H
i), labor (L
i) and capital (K
i).  We assume that a local labor 
market and a lease market for land exist, but that there is no market for capital.
 Below, we consider the 
implications of relaxing the assumption that capital is not marketed. If labor is hired by a household, the 
household pays a wage (w) to the worker plus a transaction cost (cl
i) of monitoring the worker’s effort.  
We assume that the transaction cost is a non-decreasing function of the amount of labor hired (cl
i
L‡0) 
(subscripts denote partial derivatives).  
If a plot of land (s) is leased out, the landlord charges a lease payment, which is a linear 
combination of a share of output (1-a) and a fixed rent (b): 
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If 0<a<1 and b=0, then the contract is a pure share contract.  If a=1 and b>0, then the contract is a fixed 
rent contract.  We assume that a mixture of share and rental in a contract is possible.    
The landlord can monitor and enforce the tenant’s use of inputs on the plot, and hence can select 
the level of inputs, but pays a transaction cost for this (ch).  We assume that this cost is a non-decreasing 
function of the size of the plot, and of the amount of labor and capital applied by the tenant (chH‡0, 
chL‡0, chK‡0).  We also assume that the monitoring costs are a non-increasing function of the share of 
output received by the tenant, since the tenant has greater incentive to apply effort if he receives a higher 
share (chá￿0).   
For simplicity, we assume that each landlord household operates only one owned plot and leases 
out one plot, and that each tenant operates his own plot plus one leased in plot.  Thus, each landlord deals 










a strictly concave function.  We assume that tenants select their level of leisure (M
t) and labor use on their 
own plot (L
t), considering the lease terms specified by the landlord (á, â, H
s, L
s, K
s).  The tenant’s 
maximization problem is thus: 
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t) is the tenant’s income from other assets (z
t) and other variables are as defined above.   
The first order conditions for this problem are (assuming an interior solution): 
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Before we consider the landlord’s problem, it is useful to note that if the landlord can not enforce 
the tenant’s labor or capital use on the leased in plot, the tenant will also choose L
s and K
s to maximize 3), 
resulting in two additional first order conditions: 
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These equations illustrate the “Marshallian” result that productive inefficiency results if the 
tenant’s inputs are not enforceable. If the same production function applies to the tenant’s own plot and 
leased in plot (F
t( )=F
s( )) and if L and K are normal inputs, then labor and capital use per hectare and 
yield will be lower on sharecropped than tenant’s own plot if á<1 (Shaban). 
Enforceable Contracts 
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b a  
subject to the tenant’s participation constraint 
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and the first order conditions of the tenant’s problem (4) and 5)).   
    The first order conditions for this problem (assuming an interior solution) lead to the following 
conditions, in addition to equations 4), 5) and 9):
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Fixed Transaction Costs 
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  If the production functions for the tenant’s own and sharecropped plots are the same (F
t( ) = F
s( )) 


















Thus, even though there is no capital market, equalization of all marginal rates of substitution and 
marginal products between each landlord and tenant occurs through the operation of the labor and land 
lease markets if transaction costs are constant.  This does not guarantee unconstrained pareto optimality in 
the economy, since with positive fixed transaction costs there may be households that do not participate in 
these factor markets, or differences across landlord-tenant pairs in the marginal products and rates of 
substitution.  If transaction costs are zero, the model reduces to Cheung’s model, and pareto optimality is 
achieved. 
  In the efficient markets case with zero transaction costs, the total amount of land operated by any 
household will not depend upon its own endowment of land or labor, though it will depend upon the 
household’s endowment of capital, due to the non-marketability of capital.  Thus a simple test of the 
efficient land and labor markets hypothesis is whether the land area operated by households is affected by 
their endowments of land or labor.  Under efficient land markets, these endowments should have no effect 
on area operated, factor intensities or yields.   
    A test of the assumption of non-marketable capital is whether the household’s endowment of 
capital has any effect on area operated.  If capital is marketable with no transactions costs, this 
endowment should also not affect area operated.  If capital is not marketable, then households with 





land if capital and labor are substitutes (FKH<0).  The capital endowment will not affect factor ratios or 
yields in this case, however.  If capital is marketable but subject to transaction costs, the effect of capital 
endowment would be analogous to the effect of labor endowment when labor is marketable but subject to 
transaction costs.   
Variable Transaction Costs 
  In the case with variable transaction costs, the unconstrained pareto optimum is no longer 
achieved, since there will be differences in marginal rates of substitution and marginal products of factors 
across households.  For example, if chá < 0, equation 12) implies that the marginal rate of substitution 
between risky income and riskless income (EuQè/EuQ) will be greater for the landlord than the tenant, and 
suggests that the tenant will bear more risk (and the landlord less risk) than if the transaction cost were 









Q is a decreasing function of á.
iv The 
landlord seeks to increase á above the level at which perfect risk pooling occurs, sacrificing optimal risk 
pooling in order to reduce transaction costs.  This suggests that a pure rental contract will be more likely 
in situations where the transaction costs of monitoring land leases are larger and more responsive to 
changes in á.
v We expect this to be more likely if the tenant and landlord are unrelated than if they are 
relatives or long associates.  Thus, we expect sharecropping to be more common among relatives or long 
associates, and rental contracts to be more common among unrelated individuals. 
In general, this model predicts differences in marginal products, factor intensities and yields 
across different households and between different plots within households.  The signs of these differences 
are generally ambiguous, and depend on the relative magnitudes of the marginal transaction cost terms.   





H. A positive marginal cost of monitoring land use by the tenant will cause the landlord to restrict 
land availability to the tenant, even when the tenant has a higher marginal product of land. This effect is 
even stronger when the transaction cost depends on the tenant’s share, since the tenant is forced to bear 





differences in yields and factor intensities.  If the production function is of the CES class, then yield is a 
positive function of the marginal product of land.
vi  Thus, if chH>0 or chá<0, the tenant’s yield on the 
leased in plot must be higher than the landlord’s yield on his own plot.  This implies that the landlord 
applies less labor or capital per hectare, or both (if K and L are normal).  This contrasts with the 
Marshallian prediction that factor intensities and yields are higher on owner-operated than sharecropped 
plots.  Note, however, that our prediction compares tenants’ to landlords’ factor intensities and yields.   
  If the marginal transaction costs of monitoring fixed rent contracts are zero, then our model 
predicts that factor intensities and yields will be the same on the tenant’s plots under fixed rent as on the 
tenant’s or landlord’s own plots. However, the owner may also need to monitor the fixed rental tenant’s 
use of the plot to ensure that the tenant is not depleting soil fertility or otherwise damaging the plot 
(Murrell).  In this case, there would be differences in factor intensities and yields between owner-operated 
plots and plots leased in under fixed rental.   
 
Econometric Approach and Results 
  The theory presented above predicts that land use, lease contract choice, use of labor, oxen and 
output may depend on many factors.  If transaction costs are negligible, most of these factors are 
irrelevant and only endowments of non-marketed assets and prices should matter.  Of course, we would 
not expect to observe sole owner-operators if transaction costs are negligible, so we have a priori reason 
to believe that (at least fixed) transaction costs are important in land markets in the villages studied.  The 
empirical implications of this are to be determined. 
  We have data on three types of dependent variables:  1) cropland area operated; 2) choice of land 
tenure contract when land is imported; and 3) labor use, oxen use, and value of output per unit of land.  





Cropland Area Operated 
Econometric Model 
  We do not observe actual cropland area operated, but rather the area “owned” (allocated by the 
Peasant Association) plus the area “imported” (acquired by fixed rental, sharecropping, gift or 
borrowing).  We do not have reliable information on the amount of cropland “exported”.   Cropland area 
operated is thus observed for cropland importer/non-exporters, but left-censored for other households.  
We therefore use a censored regression model for area operated. 
  Define hop as ln(area operated by a cropland importer), h as ln(H+Himported) and h as ln(H).  We 
assume that  
21)  h h h op u x h + = b  
for cropland importers, where xh is a vector of observed variables affecting desired area operated, and uh 
is an unobserved error term.  hop is observed only for households that import but do not export cropland.  
For these households, we have that  
22)  h h h op u x h h + = = b  
For all other households, we have that
vii: 
 23)  h h h u x h + ‡b  
  We estimate this model two ways: 1) maximum likelihood estimation, assuming that uh is 
independently and identically normally distributed across households, and 2) censored least absolute 
deviation (CLAD) estimation using the method of Buchinsky, which avoids any distributional assumption 
concerning uh. 
  According to the theory presented earlier, area operated may be affected by the household’s 
endowments of land, labor, capital, other assets determining household income, factors associated with 
the household’s reservation utility or preferences, factors affecting the household’s agricultural 
productivity, factors affecting transaction costs, relative prices and wages, and the endowments, 





endowments are represented by the logarithms of land owned, household labor supply, value of oxen 
owned, and value of other livestock owned.
viii  We also include dummy variables for households with no 
land, oxen, or other livestock, since these cases otherwise cause difficulties for the log-log specification 
used.
ix  Human capital endowments (potentially affecting both farm productivity and non-farm sources of 
income) are represented by the logarithm of age of the household head and the level of education of the 
household head.  Transaction costs may be affected by many of these factors, as well as by social status 
and networks of the household.  We represent these by indicators of the length of time the farm household 
has been settled in the village and the ethnicity of the household. Village level dummy variables reflect 
differences across villages in agroclimatic factors affecting farm productivity, relative prices, access to 
markets or off-farm sources of income. 
Results 
  The censored regression results are presented in table 2.  The maximum likelihood estimates 
support the transaction costs model, since area operated is found to be positively and statistically 
significantly associated with land ownership.  The positive effect of oxen ownership also supports the 
transaction costs model, implying imperfections in oxen rental markets and that oxen and land are 
complementary inputs.  Area operated also varies significantly across villages. 
  In the CLAD estimation, only village effects are statistically significant.  The effect of oxen 
ownership is in the same direction and similar in magnitude as in the maximum likelihood (ML) model, 
but is no longer statistically significant due to the larger standard errors in the CLAD model.  By contrast, 
the effect of land ownership is much smaller in magnitude and of the opposite sign in the CLAD model to 
that expected (for the coefficient of ln(area operated)).  The CLAD results reduce our confidence in the 
implication that imperfections in the land lease market exist, and suggest that those results hinge upon 
distributional assumptions of the ML model.  On the other hand, the insignificant effect of oxen 
ownership in the CLAD model may simply be a result of the lower statistical power of that model (given 
the similar magnitude of the coefficients in both models).  Next we examine the other evidence available 







  For imported fields, we model the choice of tenure arrangement using a multinomial logit model.  
We include the same explanatory variables as in the regression for land imports.  Since the data are for 
specific tenancy contracts, we can include explanatory variables specific to the particular landlord as well.  
One factor that may be an additional important indicator of the transaction costs of the contract is the 
relationship between the landowner and tenant.  If the landowner is a relative of the tenant or if the tenant 
and the landlord have established a long-term relationship, the transaction costs may be lower, thus 
tending to favor sharecropping or gift/borrowing over a fixed rental arrangement.  Thus we include 
variables indicating whether the landlord is a relative of the tenant and the number of years the farmer has 
farmed the plot.   
Results 
  As expected, the length of time the tenant has farmed the plot is positively associated with both 
sharecropping and gift or borrowing arrangements (table 3).  Recent immigrants to the village are very 
unlikely to acquire plots by sharecropping, while gift and borrowed plots are much more common when 
the landowner is a relative of the tenant.  These findings confirm our expectations about the importance of 
social relationships in determining land contract choice. 
  Other factors affecting contract choice include lack of ownership of livestock other than oxen 
(negative association of dummy variable with sharecropping), household labor supply (negative 
association with land gifts/borrowing), and literacy (literate households less likely to receive land through 
gifts/borrowing). The negative associations of household labor supply and literacy with land 
gifts/borrowing suggests that gifts and loans of land may be reserved for poor relatives who have few 
alternative income earning opportunities. Households with greater human capital endowments may be 
better able to afford to rent or sharecrop land, which may be of higher quality.  We do not have a strong 





that sharecropping can be a way for tenants who lack access to liquidity to lease land, we expected if 
anything a positive relationship between lack of livestock and sharecropping.
x 
Input Use and Output Value per Hectare  
Econometric Model 
  The econometric model estimated for these dependent variables can be summarized as follows: 
24) 
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where yhp is ln(labor use per ha.), ln(oxen use per ha.), or ln(value of output per ha.) for household h and 
plot p; Dih and Dxh are dummy variables equal to 1 if household h is a land importer or exporter, 
respectively; Drp, Dsp and Dgp are dummy variables equal to 1 if plot p is rented, sharecropped or 
gift/borrowed, respectively;  xh and xp are vectors of household and plot characteristics affecting the 
dependent variables; vhp are unobserved factors affecting the dependent variables, and a, bi, bx, br,  bs, bg, 
bir, bis, big,  bh, bp are coefficients to be estimated. 
  We include interactions between households’ land trade status and the tenure status of the plot to 
be able to test the specific hypotheses following from the theory presented above.  For example, to test the 
implication of the transaction costs model that yields will be higher on sharecroppers’ leased-in plots than 
landlords’ owner-operated plots, we cannot determine this from the average effect of either the land trade 
status of the household or the tenancy status of the plot.  We need interaction terms for this. 
The following hypotheses are tested: 
Hypothesis  Test 
1)  y(rented|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  br + bir = 0 
2)  y(shared|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  bs + bis = 0 
3)  y(gift/borrowed|importer) - y(owned|importer) = 0  bg + big = 0 
4)  y(rented|importer) – y(owned|exporter) = 0  br + bir + bi – bx = 0 





6)  y(gift/borrowed|importer) – y(owned|exporter) = 0  bg + big + bi – bx = 0 
 
  Tests 1) – 3) compare inputs and outputs on a tenant’s imported plots and his own plots.  These 
tests are comparable to the tests for Marshallian inefficiency in studies such as Bell and Shaban.  
Marshallian inefficiency implies that bs + bis < 0.  Tests 4)-6) test the predictions of the transactions costs 
theory that inputs and outputs should be greater on tenants’ imported plots than on landlords’ own plots. 
We estimated two versions of the model.  In one, xh includes the same explanatory variables used 
to predict area operated.  In the second version, we included household level fixed effects to account for 
all possible household level factors (measured or unmeasured) affecting the dependent variables.  The 
fixed effects model was estimated for the subsample of households who were cropland importers and also 
operated PA-allocated land.  This is similar to the approach devised by Shaban to test for Marshallian 
inefficiency.  In the fixed effects regressions, we could not include household level factors (xh, Dih, Dxh).  
Thus, we could not test hypotheses 4)-6) using fixed effects regressions. 
  The measured plot level characteristics assumed to affect input use and output include the type of 
soil, the slope of the field, whether there had been erosion problems on the field, the use of irrigation on 
the field, and the distance of the field from the household compound. 
The endogeneity of the contract choice for imported fields could lead to biased estimates in the 
model above.  To address this issue, we estimated equation (24) using instrumental variables, taking as 
instruments for contract choice the predicted probabilities of each import contract from a multinomial 
logit regression.
xi   
In all of the above regressions, coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to account for sample 
stratification and sample weights.  The estimated standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and to 
non-independence of multiple observations from the same household. 
Results 
  In the regressions without household fixed effects, we find statistically significant effects of the 





(table 4).  To interpret these coefficients, we need to consider the hypothesis tests discussed above.  In the 
hypothesis tests based on the no-fixed effects regressions, we find that labor use is more than 26% lower 
on importers’ sharecropped plots than on their owner-operated plots, and that this difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (table 5).  However, we find no statistically significant differences 
in oxen use or yield on importers’ sharecropped vs. owner-operated plots, and the estimated yield 
difference is only 3%.
xii  Furthermore, in the fixed-effects regressions, there are no statistically significant 
differences in input use or yields between importers’ sharecropped and owner-operated plots, and the 
magnitude of the differences are relatively small.  The results thus provide little support for the hypothesis 
of Marshallian inefficiency of sharecropping. 
  We also find no statistically significant difference between input use and yields on importers’ 
cash rented plots and their owner-operated plots, and that the estimated differences are relatively small 
(especially in the fixed-effects regressions).  This is consistent with the assumption that the transactions 
costs of monitoring fixed rental contracts are low, leading to relatively efficient use of rented plots as 
well. 
We find that estimated input use and yields are substantially lower on importers’ gift/borrowed 
plots than on their owner-operated plots, though the difference is statistically significant only for oxen 
use.  Perhaps this is because operators of gift/borrowed plots own fewer oxen on average than owner-
operators, or to unobserved differences in land quality. 
  We do not find statistically significant differences in output value per hectare on importers’ 
leased-in plots and exporters’ owner-operated plots, as predicted by the transaction costs theory.  The 
estimated differences are in the direction predicted by the theory (higher for importers’ rented or 
sharecropped plots than exporters owner-operated plots) but are relatively small in magnitude, 
particularly for sharecropping (about 5% higher on importers’ sharecropped plots).  Furthermore, 
predicted differences in input use are in the opposite direction to that predicted by the theory (though not 





output regressions, consistent with the findings from the CLAD regression for area operated.  The results 
are more consistent with the “New School” model of efficient land lease markets. 
These results provide little evidence to support the Marshallian view of the inefficiency of 
sharecropping.  This may partly be due to the fact that landlords share some inputs in production, which 
can help to reduce or offset the incentive effects.  However, landlords share very little of the inputs of pre-
harvest labor or oxen, so one would still expect less of these inputs to be applied on sharecropped fields, 
if the Marshallian assumption of no monitoring and enforcement of labor effort were correct.  Some form 
of monitoring and enforcement appears to take place with sharecropping contracts in these Ethiopian 
villages. 
  Several household-level factors significantly affect input use and output per hectare, indicating 
that other factor market imperfections may be important.  Labor use per hectare is greater for households 
having a larger labor endowment, and less where the head of household is older.  Oxen ownership has a 
positive impact on output value (significant at the 10% level).  More educated household heads apply less 
labor (10% level).  We also find a positive effect of household labor supply on oxen use (10% level), 
supporting the hypothesis that capital and labor are complementary.  Households that have not been long 
established in the village use less oxen input per hectare and achieve lower yields.  This suggests that 
farmers’ options for leasing or borrowing oxen depend upon social relationships as developed through 
long presence in the community. Household level fixed effects are highly jointly significant (at the 0.01% 
level) in all regressions.  These household level effects imply that factor markets do not perfectly equalize 
factor ratios and yields, and suggest that imperfections in labor or oxen markets are responsible.   
 
Conclusions and Implications 
Our empirical findings are most consistent with the “New School” perspective, indicating that 
land lease markets were operating relatively efficiently in the villages studied in 1994.  We do not find 
empirical support for the “Marshallian” prediction of inefficient sharecropping, since factor intensity and 





factor intensity or output value differs significantly between cropland importers and exporters, or that 
cropland area operated is a function of area owned, as predicted by the transaction costs theory. 
As argued by Otsuka, Chuma and Hayami, it is likely that in the absence of institutional 
restrictions on contract choice, the selection of tenancy contracts will tend to minimize inefficiency.  
Thus, landlords who do not know prospective tenants well or for whom monitoring the tenant may be 
costly will tend to prefer a cash rental contract to a sharecropping contract.   Where sharecropping is 
preferred, transaction costs are lower and hence the inefficiency is limited.  Furthermore, landlords who 
do participate in sharecropping contracts reduce the incentive problems by sharing some of the costs. 
  Although we find that land lease markets function relatively efficiently in the study villages, our 
data were collected prior to adoption of restrictions on land leasing by the Oromia Regional Government 
in 1995.  These restrictions allow farmers to lease out no more than half of their land for a maximum of 
three years.  Such restrictions may well have reduced the efficiency of lease markets in the region.  
Investigation of the impacts of these restrictions would be useful. 
  We do find evidence of imperfections in labor or oxen lease markets.  Efforts to improve the 
functioning of these markets are thus more likely to improve agricultural efficiency than efforts focused 
on improving land lease markets. 
  Another implication of our results is that village level factors are important determinants of input 
use and productivity.  It may be that differences in productivity across the study villages resulted from 
local variations in rainfall or other idiosyncratic factors in 1994, so too much should not be made of this 
result.  However, if such village level differences persist over time, they suggest that factor markets do 
not function efficiently to equalize marginal returns to productive factors across villages.  More research 
on this issue at a broader scale would enable identification of which village-level factors are causing 







Table 1 – Characteristics of Households and Cultivated Plots under Different Tenure Arrangements 
 
  Type of Tenure 
Item  PA-allocated  Fixed rent  Sharecrop  Gift/borrowed  All fields 
Number of sample fields    149  64  31  56  300 
  - means (standard errors in parentheses)
1   
Characteristics of operator households         
  -  Cropland owned (ha)    1.93  (0.12)    1.00  (0.25)    1.20  (0.31)         0.16         (0.09)     1.46       (0.14) 
  -   Household labor force    2.69  (0.18)    1.95  (0.22)    2.05  (0.28)         1.28         (0.10)     2.31       (0.15) 
  -   Value of oxen owned (EB)    1666  (134)    1670  (232)    1688  (313)          676          (137)    1537        (139) 
  -   Value of other livestock owned (EB)    1874  (202)    1669  (274)    1538  (336)          687          (130)    1646        (181) 
  -   Age of household head (years)    41.1  (1.9)    30.0  (1.6)    31.0  (2.3)         24.3           (1.1)     35.9         (1.5) 
    -   Education of household head           
  --   % illiterate    38.4  (6.4)    14.1  (5.6)    15.3  (6.9)           4.1          (2.7)     27.3         (5.0) 
  --   % can read and write    20.3  (5.1)    7.1  (3.9)    7.6  (4.7)           0.0          (0.0)     14.1         (4.0) 
  --   % completed primary school    17.9  (5.9)    26.3  (7.9)    32.3  (12.5)         39.7          (8.9)      23. 7        (5.3) 
  --   % completed secondary school    23.4  (5.9)    52.6  (9.5)    44.9  (12.5)         56.2          (9.0)      34.9        (6.0) 
    -   Length of family residence in village           
  --   % whose father was born in village    42.6  (6.5)    56.1  (9.8)    52.2  (12.6)         67.3          (8.4)      49.2        (6.1) 
  --   % whose father immigrated but were born in 
village 
  47.4  (6.9)    39.5    (9.9)    47.8  (12.6)         29.5          (8.2)      43.7        (6.3) 
  --   % who immigrated to village    10.0  (3.7)    4.4    (3.7)    0.0  (0.0)           3.2          (2.8)        7.1        (2.8) 
    -    Ethnicity - % Oromo    74.1  (5.8)    75.6    (8.6)    63.3  (12.8)         71.5          (7.7)      72.9        (5.4) 
   -   Relationship to landowner - % with landowner a 
relative 
  N/A    31.0    (6.0)    31.5  (11.1)         89.3          (5.5)      45.2        (5.4) 
    -    Number of years household has farmed the plot          8.31          (0.93)         0.59        (0.12)        1.80        (0.49)         1.62         (0.28)      5.45       (0.60) 
Characteristics of Fields           
  -  % having red soil    4.6  (1.3)    11.4    (4.2)    11.1  (4.7)          12.1         (4.1)        7.4        (1.3) 
  -   % flat or gently sloped (not stony)    77.3  (4.0)    78.6  (5.7)    82.7  (7.2)          86.3         (4.4)      79.3        (2.7) 
  -   % with no reported erosion  problems    78.2  (3.9)    82.6  (5.0)    70.7  (8.9)          71.8         (7.4)      77.3        (3.2) 
  -   % irrigated    23.1  (3.7)    14.9  (5.0)    15.3  (7.2)          19.8         (6.0)      20.5        (3.0) 
  -   Distance from field to compound   (meters)    1281  (100)    1816  (179)    1469  (311)         1338        (225)     1398         (89) 
Input use and outputs – 1993/94           
  -  total labor hours per ha     190  (12)    188  (21)    139  (14)  192           (22)       184           (9) 
  -   total oxen hours per ha    376  (16)    402  (38)    309  (28)  359           (29)       371         (14) 
  -   total value of output per ha (EB)    2872  (111)    2623  (181)    2534  (293)  2233          (183)     2710         (85) 
1Means and standard errors were corrected for stratification, sampling weights, and clustering (non-independence of observations within households.)  Difference in 





 Table 2 – Determinants of ln(Cropland Area Operated) – Censored Regressions 
 
Explanatory variable  Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation 
Censored Least Absolute 
Deviations Estimation 
Village (cf. Abichiu Peasant Association) 
-  Bilalo Peasant Association 
-  Ketar Genet Peasant Association  









ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.353**  -0.004 
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland owned=0)  -0.363**  -0.031 
ln (Household labor supply) (number of workers)  0.048  0.348 
ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  0.338***  0.400 
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen owned=0)  1.842**  2.167 
ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  0.051  0.075 
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when other livestock owned=0)  0.158  0.273 
ln(age of household head) (years)  -0.338  -0.035 
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 









Length of time in village (cf. father born in village) 
-  Father immigrated to village, farmer born in village 







Ethnicity of household Oromo  -0.016  -0.356 
Intercept  -1.450  -2.653 
Number of uncensored/total observations  78/161  77/161
b 
Pseudo R
2    0.479 
 
a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Coefficients and standard errors of maximum likelihood 
estimator were corrected for sample weights and stratification.   





Table 3 – Determinants of Lease Contract Choice - Multinomial Logit Model 
 
Explanatory Variables
a  Sharecropping Contract  Gift/Borrowed 
Village (cf. Abichiu Peasant Association) 
-  Bilalo Peasant Association 
-  Ketar Genet Peasant Association  









ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.237  -1.165 
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland owned=0)  -0.884  -0.456 
ln(Household labor supply) (number of workers)  -0.171  -1.760*** 
ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  -0.520  -0.657 
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen owned=0)  -4.000  -2.957 
ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  -0.329  -0.322 
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when other livestock 
owned=0) 
-43.866***  -1.391 
ln(Age of household head) (years)  0.372  1.577 
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 









Length of time in village (cf. father born in village) 
-  Father immigrated to village, farmer born in village 







Ethnicity of household Oromo  -0.738  -0.332 
Landlord is a relative of tenant  0.038  3.440*** 
Number of years farmer has farmed the plot  1.576***  1.939*** 
Mean predicted probabilities|actual contract
b 
-  Fixed rent 
-  Sharecrop 









a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Omitted category is cash rental.  Coefficients and 
standard errors were corrected for sample weights, stratification and clustering.  Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.  Intercepts are 
not reported.  Number of observations is 151. 





Table 4 – Determinants of Input and Output per Ha. – Instrumental Variables Regressions  
 
Without Household Fixed Effects
c  With Household Fixed Effects















Cropland importer  0.182*  0.006  -0.003       
Cropland exporter  0.135  -0.030  -0.076       
Fixed rent plot
b  0.029  0.163  0.029  0.006  -0.110  -0.059 
Sharecropped plot
b  -1.538***  -0.985***  -0.341**  -0.008  -0.034  -0.119 
Borrowed/gift plot
b  -0.797***  -0.627***  -0.170  -0.234  -0.879***  -0.393 
Importer x fixed rent interaction
b  -0.285  -0.294  0.046       
Importer x sharecropped interaction
b  1.238***  0.817***  0.313       
Importer x borrowed/gift interaction
b  0.578**  0.360*  -0.068       
Village (cf. Abichiu) 
-  Bilalo  
-  Ketar Genet 













     
Ln(Crop land owned) (ha)  0.013  -0.007  -0.033       
Landless (dummy variable=1 when cropland 
owned=0) 
0.055  0.156  0.096       
ln(Household labor supply) (number of 
workers) 
0.188**  0.103*  0.119       
Ln(Value of oxen owned) (EB)  0.0569  0.0113  0.128*       
No oxen (dummy variable=1 when oxen 
owned=0) 
0.480  0.115  0.865*       
Ln(Value of other livestock owned) (EB)  -0.0291  -0.0090  -0.0225       
No other livestock (dummy variable=1 when 
other livestock owned=0) 
0.008  -0.017  -0.095       
Ln(Age of household head) (years)  -0.423***  0.154  -0.162       
Education of household head (cf. illiterate) 
-  Read and write 
-  Finished primary school 













     
Length of time in village (cf. father born) 
-  Father immigrated to village, 
farmer born in village 















   
Ethnicity of household Oromo  0.002  -0.031  -0.083       
Number of years farmer has farmed the plot  -0.0095  -0.046  0.058  0.229  -0.021  0.016 
Red soil on field  -0.007  0.064  0.069  0.300  0.280  0.030 
Flat or gently sloping field  0.022  -0.012  -0.093  -0.144  -0.049  -0.028 
Erosion problem on field  -0.039  -0.026  -0.003  0.014  0.0005  -0.047 
Irrigated field  -0.106  -0.095  -0.136**  -0.306*  -0.082  -0.163 
Distance from field to compound (km.)  -0.0476**  0.0133  -0.0149  -0.061  -0.001  -0.043 
R
2  0.202  0.353  0.357  0.416  0.549  0.453 
a.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
b.  Instrumental variables used for tenure categories and interactions include predicted probabilities of each 
land lease type, predicted by a multinomial logit model including household fixed effects, and interactions 
between predicted probabilities of land lease types and cropland importer dummy. 
c.  Number of observations = 300. 





Table 5 – Hypothesis Tests about Impacts of Land Tenure Variables 
 
Without Household Fixed Effects  With Household Fixed Effects   
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ii These results are proved in the appendix to Pender and Fafchamps (2001). 
iii This can be shown by writing the production function as F(H,K,L)=Hf(k,l), where k=K/H, l=L/H, and f( ) is a 
strictly concave function.  Since FK=fk(k,l) and FL=fl,(k,l) and f( ) is strictly concave, we can invert this system to 
determine k=g(FK,FL) and l=h(FK,FL).  Since FK
s=FK
t  and FL
s=FL









t).  Since FH=f-fkk-fll, this implies that FH
s= FH
t. 
iv The proof is given in the appendix to Pender and Fafchamps (2001).  The assumption of constant or increasing 
absolute risk aversion is a sufficient but not necessary condition.  These results may also hold with decreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 
v We say “suggests” since we do not offer a formal proof of this hypothesis.  The proof is difficult due to the large 
number of endogenous variables in the system of equations 4), 5), and 9)-15).  However, the intuition that the 
landlord would increase á if doing so would reduce transactions costs seems compelling to us. 






vii If a household does not import land (either autarkic or an exporter), then desired operated area (if it were to 
import) must be less than or equal to its endowment (h) plus some positive amount (Äh) necessary for an importer to 
overcome fixed transaction costs.  Ideally, Äh should be included on the left side of relation 23) and estimated.  
However, this parameter is not identified, and excluding it biases only the intercept of âh (assuming that Äh is 
constant or randomly distributed and uncorrelated with xh).  If a household is both an exporter and importer, relation 
23) holds because area operated is less than area owned plus imported (by the amount exported).   
viii We used a logarithmic specification for these variables and the dependent variable to reduce problems of non-
normality and sensitivity to outliers.  Similar qualitative results were obtained using a linear specification. 
ix The terms with ln(0) for such cases were set to zero and a separate coefficient computed for the dummy variable. 
x Very similar results were obtained using a probit model to compare determinants of sharecropping vs. fixed rental. 
xi To increase the efficiency of the instrumental variables estimator, we included household level fixed effects in the 
multinomial logit model used to predict the instruments for contract choice.  
xii The efficiency of the estimators may be affected by the use of instrumental variables and problems of 
multicollinearity.  Very similar results were found when ordinary least squares rather than instrumental variables 
estimation was used, indicating that the use of instrumental variables did not greatly reduce efficiency.  Similar 
results were also found using a linear rather than a logarithmic specification.  Multicollinearity is a problem mainly 
for the oxen endowment variables (the correlation between ln(oxen owned) and the no oxen dummy is -0.98), and 
for some of the tenure and land trade status variables in the regressions without fixed effects, due to the interaction 
terms (variance inflation factors greater than 10 for several of these).  Dropping the ln(oxen owned) variable from 
the regressions has little impact on the regression results, except that the no oxen dummy no longer has a significant 
impact on output.  Thus multicollinearity between the oxen endowment variables does not cause major problems for 
the other regression results.  The multicollinearity among the tenure variables is unavoidable, since all of these must 
be included for the hypothesis tests. 
 